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On	  the	  Unreliability	  of	  Introspection	  For	  a	  Philosophical	  Studies	  book	  symposium	  on	  Eric	  Schwitzgebel’s,	  	  
Perplexities	  of	  Consciousness.	  	  
1. The	  Unreliability	  Thesis	  In	  his	  provocative	  and	  engaging	  new	  book,	  Perplexities	  of	  Consciousness,	  Eric	  Schwitzgebel	  argues	  that	  introspection	  is	  unreliable	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  are	  prone	  to	  ignorance	  and	  error	  in	  making	  introspective	  judgments	  about	  our	  own	  conscious	  experience.	  Let	  us	  call	  this	  the	  unreliability	  thesis.	  Schwitzgebel’s	  argument	  for	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  abstract,	  theoretical	  principles,	  but	  instead	  proceeds	  through	  a	  vivid	  discussion	  of	  an	  intriguing	  series	  of	  case	  studies,	  including	  dreams,	  depth-­‐perception,	  echolocation,	  imagery,	  inattention,	  emotion,	  conscious	  thought	  and	  phosphenes.	  In	  each	  case,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  persuade	  us	  that	  we	  encounter	  either	  disagreement	  or	  uncertainty	  about	  how	  to	  describe	  our	  own	  conscious	  experience.	  This	  serves	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  more	  general	  conclusion	  that	  our	  best	  introspective	  judgments	  about	  the	  most	  general	  features	  of	  our	  conscious	  experience	  are	  unreliable	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  ignorance	  and	  error.	  My	  aim	  here	  is	  not	  to	  challenge	  Schwitzgebel’s	  argument	  for	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  by	  disputing	  his	  treatment	  of	  individual	  cases	  or	  by	  questioning	  the	  extrapolation	  from	  unreliability	  in	  these	  cases	  to	  unreliability	  across	  the	  board.1	  Instead,	  I	  propose	  to	  concede	  the	  unreliability	  thesis,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument,	  in	  order	  to	  consider	  its	  broader	  philosophical	  implications.	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Schwitzgebel	  makes	  two	  distinct	  claims	  about	  the	  philosophical	  significance	  of	  the	  unreliability	  thesis.	  In	  chapter	  six,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  unreliability	  of	  introspection	  has	  important	  methodological	  consequences	  for	  the	  empirical	  science	  of	  consciousness.	  Introspective	  reports	  play	  an	  indispensable	  role	  as	  a	  source	  of	  evidence	  for	  scientific	  theories	  of	  the	  neural	  basis	  of	  consciousness.	  So,	  if	  these	  introspective	  reports	  are	  sufficiently	  unreliable,	  Schwitzgebel	  concludes,	  “a	  methodologically	  well	  justified	  scientific	  consensus	  on	  a	  theory	  of	  consciousness	  may	  be	  beyond	  our	  reach”	  (2011:	  115).	  In	  chapter	  seven,	  Schwitzgebel	  makes	  a	  further	  suggestion	  that	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  has	  important	  epistemological	  consequences	  for	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  broadly	  Cartesian	  epistemology	  on	  which	  introspective	  judgments	  about	  our	  own	  conscious	  experience	  play	  a	  foundational	  epistemic	  role.	  Thus,	  he	  writes:	  	   Descartes	  thought,	  or	  is	  often	  portrayed	  as	  thinking,	  that	  we	  know	  our	  own	  experience	  first	  and	  most	  directly	  and	  then	  infer	  from	  it	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  If	  that	  is	  right	  –	  if	  our	  judgments	  about	  the	  outside	  world,	  to	  be	  trustworthy,	  must	  be	  grounded	  in	  sound	  judgments	  about	  our	  experiences	  –	  then	  our	  epistemic	  situation	  is	  dire	  indeed.	  However,	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  accept	  any	  such	  introspective	  foundationalism.	  Indeed,	  I	  suspect	  that	  the	  opposite	  is	  nearer	  the	  truth:	  Our	  judgments	  about	  the	  world	  tend	  to	  drive	  our	  judgments	  about	  our	  experience.	  Properly	  so,	  since	  the	  former	  are	  the	  more	  secure.	  (2011:	  137)	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In	  these	  comments,	  I	  will	  be	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  Schwitzgebel’s	  claims	  about	  the	  epistemological	  significance	  of	  the	  unreliability	  thesis.2	  To	  anticipate,	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  that	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  a	  broadly	  Cartesian	  epistemology	  and	  hence	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  revolutionary	  epistemological	  consequences	  that	  Schwitzgebel	  claims	  it	  does.	  First,	  though,	  I	  want	  to	  raise	  a	  question	  about	  how	  radical	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  is	  intended	  to	  be.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Schwitzgebel	  rejects	  
infallibilism	  about	  introspection	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  thesis	  that	  introspection	  is	  always	  a	  source	  of	  knowledge.	  However,	  despite	  its	  historical	  association	  with	  Descartes,	  infallibilism	  has	  few,	  if	  any,	  contemporary	  proponents.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  equally	  clear	  that	  Schwitzgebel	  rejects	  skepticism	  about	  introspection	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  thesis	  that	  introspection	  is	  never	  a	  source	  of	  knowledge;	  as	  he	  admits,	  “I	  am	  not	  an	  utter	  skeptic”	  (2011:	  139).	  Schwitzgebel	  rejects	  these	  two	  extreme	  views	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  more	  moderate	  view	  that	  introspection	  is	  sometimes,	  but	  not	  always,	  a	  source	  of	  knowledge.	  On	  this	  view,	  introspection	  is	  neither	  perfectly	  reliable	  nor	  perfectly	  unreliable.	  All	  this	  seems	  true,	  but	  not	  particularly	  controversial.	  Echoing	  Schwitzgebel	  (2011:	  119),	  one	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  ask,	  “Where	  are	  the	  firebrands?”	  It	  strikes	  me	  that	  what	  is	  most	  radical	  in	  Schwitzgebel’s	  work	  on	  introspection	  is	  his	  opposition	  to	  what	  we	  might	  call	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  thesis	  that	  introspection	  is	  epistemically	  privileged	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  more	  reliable,	  or	  less	  vulnerable	  to	  ignorance	  and	  error,	  than	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing	  about	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  sensory	  perception.	  In	  one	  form	  or	  another,	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis	  is	  still	  widely	  endorsed	  and	  continues	  to	  exert	  a	  powerful	  influence	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in	  contemporary	  epistemology.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis	  is	  perhaps	  best	  stated	  in	  comparative	  terms:	  introspection	  is	  no	  more	  reliable	  than	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing	  about	  the	  world,	  including	  sensory	  perception;	  indeed,	  if	  anything,	  it	  is	  less	  reliable.	  This	  comparative	  claim	  is	  what	  motivates	  Schwitzgebel’s	  rejection	  of	  Cartesian	  epistemology,	  which	  he	  sums	  up	  as	  follows:	  “Descartes,	  I	  think,	  had	  it	  quite	  backward	  when	  he	  said	  the	  mind	  –	  including	  especially	  current	  conscious	  experience	  –	  was	  better	  known	  than	  the	  outside	  world”	  (2011:	  136).	  Schwitzgebel’s	  arguments	  for	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  constitute	  a	  powerful	  challenge	  to	  contemporary	  incarnations	  of	  Cartesian	  epistemology	  that	  rely	  on	  some	  version	  of	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis.	  My	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  challenge	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis.	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  need	  not	  have	  the	  revolutionary	  consequences	  that	  Schwitzgebel	  claims	  it	  does	  for	  the	  prospects	  of	  a	  broadly	  Cartesian	  epistemology.	  	  
2. Cartesian	  Skepticism	  Cartesian	  skepticism	  provides	  a	  useful	  starting	  point	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  epistemological	  differences	  between	  introspection	  and	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing	  about	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  sensory	  perception.	  After	  all,	  as	  Schwitzgebel	  observes,	  “Current	  conscious	  experience	  is	  generally	  the	  last	  refuge	  of	  the	  skeptic	  against	  uncertainty”	  (2011:	  117).	  Descartes’	  skeptical	  hypothesis	  that	  I	  am	  dreaming,	  or	  that	  I	  am	  deceived	  by	  an	  evil	  demon,	  is	  incompatible	  with	  my	  perceptual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world,	  but	  not	  with	  my	  introspective	  knowledge	  of	  my	  own	  conscious	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experience.	  As	  Descartes	  puts	  the	  point	  in	  the	  Second	  Meditation,	  “Because	  I	  may	  be	  dreaming,	  I	  can’t	  say	  for	  sure	  that	  I	  now	  see	  the	  flames,	  hear	  the	  wood	  crackling,	  and	  feel	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  fire;	  but	  I	  certainly	  seem	  to	  see,	  to	  hear,	  and	  to	  be	  warmed.”	  Nevertheless,	  Schwitzgebel	  claims	  that	  we	  can	  construct	  skeptical	  scenarios	  that	  threaten	  our	  introspective	  knowledge	  of	  our	  own	  conscious	  experience	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  Cartesian	  skeptical	  scenarios	  threaten	  our	  perceptual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world.	  Thus,	  he	  writes:	  	   If	  you	  admit	  the	  possibility	  that	  you	  are	  dreaming,	  I	  think	  you	  should	  admit	  the	  possibility	  that	  your	  judgment	  that	  you	  are	  having	  red	  phenomenology	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  delirium	  not	  accompanied	  by	  any	  reddish	  phenomenology.	  (2011:	  124)	  	  Schwitzgebel	  is	  certainly	  correct	  that	  such	  cases	  of	  delirium	  are	  possible;	  indeed,	  an	  actual	  case	  is	  found	  in	  patients	  with	  Anton’s	  syndrome,	  who	  are	  blind,	  but	  believe	  that	  they	  can	  see.3	  And	  yet,	  as	  I	  explain	  below,	  these	  cases	  are	  quite	  unlike	  Cartesian	  skeptical	  scenarios	  in	  ways	  that	  reflect	  an	  important	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  perception	  and	  introspection.	  In	  the	  First	  Meditation,	  Descartes	  invites	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  we	  are	  like	  “brain-­‐damaged	  madmen	  who	  are	  convinced	  they	  are	  kings	  when	  really	  they	  are	  paupers,	  or	  say	  they	  are	  dressed	  in	  purple	  when	  they	  are	  naked,	  or	  that	  they	  are	  pumpkins,	  or	  made	  of	  glass.”	  It	  is	  no	  accident	  that	  Descartes	  does	  not	  rest	  here,	  since	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  I	  am	  a	  brain-­‐damaged	  madman	  functions	  quite	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differently	  in	  skeptical	  arguments	  from	  the	  more	  canonical	  form	  of	  Cartesian	  skeptical	  hypothesis	  that	  I	  am	  dreaming	  or	  deceived	  by	  an	  evil	  demon.	  The	  crucial	  difference	  is	  that	  a	  madman’s	  beliefs,	  unlike	  my	  own,	  are	  not	  justified	  by	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  senses.	  If	  I	  am	  dreaming	  or	  deceived	  by	  an	  evil	  demon,	  then	  my	  beliefs	  are	  false,	  or	  otherwise	  fail	  to	  be	  knowledge,	  although	  they	  are	  properly	  based	  on	  the	  justifying	  evidence	  of	  the	  senses.	  In	  the	  madman	  scenario,	  by	  contrast,	  my	  beliefs	  are	  false,	  or	  otherwise	  fail	  to	  be	  knowledge,	  because	  they	  are	  not	  properly	  based	  on	  the	  justifying	  evidence	  of	  the	  senses.	  In	  order	  to	  mark	  this	  contrast,	  we	  need	  to	  introduce	  a	  distinction	  between	  
brute	  errors,	  which	  are	  justified	  false	  beliefs	  that	  are	  properly	  based	  on	  justifying	  evidence,	  and	  basing	  errors,	  which	  are	  unjustified	  false	  beliefs	  that	  are	  not	  properly	  based	  on	  justifying	  evidence.4	  In	  this	  terminology,	  Descartes’	  dreaming	  and	  evil	  demon	  scenarios	  are	  cases	  involving	  brute	  errors,	  whereas	  the	  madman	  scenario	  merely	  involves	  basing	  errors.	  Similarly,	  the	  introspective	  errors	  involved	  in	  Schwitzgebel’s	  delirium	  scenario	  and	  in	  Anton’s	  syndrome	  are	  basing	  errors,	  rather	  than	  brute	  errors.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  effect	  of	  mental	  illness	  is	  that	  its	  victims	  form	  false	  beliefs	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  properly	  based	  on	  the	  justifying	  evidence	  that	  is	  provided	  by	  their	  own	  experience.	  In	  order	  to	  extend	  the	  threat	  of	  Cartesian	  skepticism	  from	  our	  perceptual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  external	  world	  to	  our	  introspective	  knowledge	  of	  our	  own	  conscious	  experience,	  we	  need	  skeptical	  scenarios	  for	  the	  case	  of	  introspection	  that	  involve	  brute	  errors,	  as	  opposed	  to	  basing	  errors.	  However,	  Schwitzgebel	  does	  not	  succeed	  in	  providing	  skeptical	  scenarios	  of	  this	  kind.	  Moreover,	  in	  my	  view,	  this	  is	  
 7	  
no	  accident.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  argue	  for	  a	  version	  of	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis	  on	  which	  introspection,	  unlike	  perception,	  is	  immune	  from	  the	  possibility	  of	  brute	  ignorance	  and	  brute	  error.	  I	  claim	  that	  all	  of	  Schwitzgebel’s	  examples	  of	  the	  unreliability	  of	  introspection	  can	  be	  explained	  away	  as	  basing	  errors,	  rather	  than	  brute	  errors.	  If	  that	  is	  right,	  then	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  a	  version	  of	  the	  Cartesian	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fundamental	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  perception	  and	  introspection.	  	  
3. The	  Simple	  Theory	  of	  Introspection	  Perception	  is	  subject	  to	  brute	  errors	  in	  which	  one	  forms	  justified,	  but	  false	  beliefs	  about	  the	  world	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  perceptual	  experience.	  After	  all,	  perceptual	  experience	  is	  representational:	  in	  veridical	  cases,	  it	  represents	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is,	  and	  in	  cases	  of	  illusion	  and	  hallucination,	  it	  misrepresents	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is.	  Moreover,	  in	  all	  these	  cases,	  one’s	  perceptual	  experience	  provides	  defeasible	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  world	  is	  the	  way	  that	  it	  is	  represented	  to	  be.	  So,	  in	  cases	  of	  perceptual	  misrepresentation,	  one’s	  perceptual	  experience	  provides	  defeasible	  justification	  to	  believe	  false	  propositions	  about	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is.	  Introspection,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  immune	  from	  brute	  errors	  in	  which	  one	  forms	  justified,	  but	  false	  beliefs	  about	  one’s	  experience	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  introspective	  representations	  that	  misrepresent	  one’s	  experience.	  On	  some	  views,	  this	  is	  because	  introspective	  beliefs	  about	  one’s	  experience	  are	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  introspective	  representations	  that	  are	  incapable	  of	  misrepresentation.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  sometimes	  claimed	  that	  conscious	  experience	  is	  self-­‐representing	  in	  the	  sense	  that	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all	  conscious	  experiences	  essentially	  represent	  themselves.5	  In	  my	  view,	  by	  contrast,	  introspection	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  forming	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  representations	  of	  conscious	  experience	  at	  all.	  According	  to	  quasi-­‐perceptual	  theories	  of	  introspection,	  one’s	  introspective	  beliefs	  about	  one’s	  experiences	  are	  caused	  and	  justified	  by	  representations	  of	  those	  experiences.	  Instead,	  I	  propose	  a	  simple	  theory	  of	  introspection	  on	  which	  one’s	  introspective	  beliefs	  about	  one’s	  own	  experiences	  are	  caused	  and	  justified	  by	  the	  experiences	  they	  are	  about.6	  According	  to	  the	  simple	  theory,	  introspection	  is	  a	  distinctive	  way	  of	  knowing	  about	  one’s	  experience	  that	  one	  has	  just	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  that	  experience.	  Similarly,	  introspective	  justification	  is	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  justification	  that	  one	  has	  to	  form	  beliefs	  about	  one’s	  experience	  just	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  that	  experience.	  There	  is	  no	  further	  requirement	  that	  one	  must	  represent	  one’s	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  have	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  that	  experience.	  On	  the	  simple	  theory,	  the	  source	  of	  one’s	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  experience	  is	  constituted	  by	  that	  experience	  itself,	  rather	  than	  any	  representation	  of	  that	  experience.	  A	  consequence	  of	  the	  simple	  theory	  is	  that	  there	  cannot	  be	  brute	  errors	  in	  the	  case	  of	  introspection	  because	  the	  source	  of	  introspective	  justification	  is	  identical	  with	  its	  subject	  matter.	  Since	  one’s	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  a	  certain	  experience	  has	  its	  source	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  has	  that	  experience,	  it	  follows	  that	  one	  cannot	  have	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  false	  propositions	  about	  one’s	  experience.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  simple	  theory	  is	  true,	  then	  all	  experiences	  satisfy	  the	  following	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis:	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   The	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis:	  one	  has	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  an	  experience	  E	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  E.	  	  However,	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis	  is	  distinct	  from,	  and	  does	  not	  entail,	  the	  doxastic	  privilege	  thesis	  below:	  	   The	  doxastic	  privilege	  thesis:	  One	  has	  an	  introspectively	  justified	  belief	  that	  one	  has	  an	  experience	  E	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  E.	  	  After	  all,	  one	  may	  have	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  a	  certain	  experience	  even	  if	  one	  does	  not	  use	  it,	  and	  perhaps	  cannot	  use	  it,	  in	  forming	  an	  introspectively	  justified	  belief.	  Since	  we	  are	  non-­‐ideal	  agents,	  our	  introspective	  beliefs	  are	  not	  always	  formed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  perfectly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  experiences	  that	  provide	  us	  with	  introspective	  justification.	  Hence,	  there	  can	  be	  introspective	  basing	  errors	  in	  which	  one	  falsely	  believes	  that	  one	  has	  an	  experience	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  experience	  of	  a	  different	  kind,	  although	  there	  can	  be	  no	  brute	  errors,	  since	  beliefs	  formed	  in	  this	  way	  are	  not	  introspectively	  justified.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  point,	  consider	  the	  initiation	  case	  in	  which	  you	  are	  threatened	  with	  a	  red	  hot	  poker	  and	  then	  touched	  on	  the	  neck	  with	  an	  ice	  cube	  so	  that	  you	  are	  tricked	  into	  mistaking	  the	  mildly	  unpleasant	  sensation	  of	  cold	  for	  an	  intensely	  painful	  sensation	  of	  heat.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  basing	  error,	  since	  you	  have	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  your	  neck	  feels	  cold,	  although	  you	  are	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tricked	  into	  forming	  a	  false	  and	  unjustified	  belief	  that	  your	  neck	  feels	  hot.	  Of	  course,	  we	  don’t	  blame	  you	  for	  believing	  this,	  but	  the	  mere	  absence	  of	  blameworthiness	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  justification.	  We	  might	  even	  say	  that	  your	  belief	  is	  reasonable	  or	  justified	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  that	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  extenuating	  circumstances	  and	  one’s	  more	  general	  psychological	  limitations.	  By	  ideal	  standards,	  however,	  the	  most	  reasonable	  or	  justified	  belief	  to	  hold	  in	  the	  circumstances	  is	  that	  one’s	  neck	  feels	  cold,	  since	  this	  is	  what	  one	  has	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  in	  virtue	  of	  having	  the	  sensation	  in	  question.	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  various	  case	  studies,	  Schwitzgebel	  makes	  a	  compelling	  case	  that	  we	  are	  prone	  to	  widespread	  ignorance	  and	  error	  in	  forming	  introspective	  judgments	  about	  our	  own	  conscious	  experience.	  This	  is	  enough	  to	  undermine	  the	  doxastic	  privilege	  thesis,	  but	  it	  leaves	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis	  intact,	  so	  long	  as	  Schwitzgebel’s	  examples	  of	  ignorance	  and	  error	  can	  be	  explained	  away	  as	  failures	  of	  basing	  in	  which	  one	  fails	  to	  believe	  what	  one	  has	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe.	  For	  instance,	  in	  chapter	  six,	  Schwitzgebel	  considers	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  we	  have	  experience	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  attention,	  such	  as	  a	  constant	  tactile	  experience	  of	  our	  feet	  in	  our	  shoes.	  On	  this	  question,	  opinion	  is	  divided:	  some	  say	  we	  do,	  others	  say	  we	  don’t,	  while	  yet	  more	  remain	  undecided.	  This	  is	  evidence	  enough	  of	  widespread	  ignorance	  and	  error	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  introspection,	  but	  can	  we	  plausibly	  maintain	  that	  this	  ignorance	  and	  error	  is	  unjustified	  at	  least	  by	  ideal	  standards,	  if	  not	  by	  ordinary	  standards?	  It	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  implausible	  prediction	  of	  the	  simple	  theory	  that	  in	  hard	  debates	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  conscious	  experience,	  one	  side	  is	  always	  more	  
 11	  
justified	  than	  the	  other,	  namely	  the	  side	  that	  happens	  to	  get	  the	  right	  answer.	  It	  is	  more	  plausible	  that	  there	  is	  approximate	  parity	  in	  respect	  of	  justification	  between	  the	  opposing	  parties	  in	  these	  debates.	  Indeed,	  given	  this	  parity,	  it	  might	  seem	  that	  the	  most	  reasonable	  or	  justified	  response	  to	  the	  disagreement	  would	  be	  to	  withhold	  belief	  altogether,	  rather	  than	  taking	  sides.	  According	  to	  the	  simple	  theory,	  however,	  if	  we	  have	  constant	  tactile	  experience	  of	  our	  feet	  in	  our	  shoes,	  then	  we	  have	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  we	  do,	  and	  if	  we	  don’t,	  we	  don’t.	  So,	  it	  may	  be	  objected,	  the	  simple	  theory	  yields	  implausible	  predictions.7	  In	  response,	  however,	  we	  need	  to	  draw	  two	  distinctions.	  The	  first	  distinction	  is	  between	  propositional	  and	  doxastic	  justification	  –	  that	  is,	  between	  which	  	  propositions	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  and	  which	  justified	  beliefs	  one	  has.	  A	  justified	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  is	  held	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  appropriately	  based	  on,	  or	  sensitive	  to,	  the	  presence	  of	  one’s	  justification	  to	  hold	  the	  belief	  in	  question.	  The	  simple	  theory	  predicts	  an	  asymmetry	  in	  propositional	  justification,	  but	  not	  doxastic	  justification:	  in	  other	  words,	  we	  may	  have	  introspective	  justification	  to	  resolve	  a	  debate	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  but	  we	  may	  be	  unable	  to	  exploit	  this	  in	  forming	  introspectively	  justified	  beliefs,	  since	  our	  doxastic	  dispositions	  may	  be	  insufficiently	  sensitive	  to	  the	  facts	  about	  conscious	  experience	  that	  determine	  which	  propositions	  we	  have	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe.8	  	  The	  second	  distinction	  is	  between	  justification	  by	  ideal	  standards	  and	  justification	  by	  ordinary	  standards.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  response	  that	  is	  most	  justified	  by	  ideal	  standards	  is	  to	  resolve	  the	  debate	  in	  one	  direction	  or	  another,	  but	  if	  our	  contingent	  doxastic	  limitations	  prevent	  us	  from	  resolving	  the	  debate	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	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justified,	  then	  withholding	  belief	  may	  be	  the	  response	  that	  is	  most	  justified	  by	  ordinary	  standards.9	  Ordinary	  standards	  of	  justification	  take	  into	  account	  these	  contingent	  doxastic	  limitations,	  whereas	  ideal	  standards	  of	  justification	  abstract	  away	  from	  them.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  simple	  theory	  of	  introspection	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  Schwitzgebel’s	  pessimism	  about	  its	  impotence	  in	  settling	  hard	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  conscious	  experience.	  We	  can	  explain	  the	  unreliability	  of	  our	  introspective	  beliefs	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  failure	  to	  use	  infallible	  introspective	  justification,	  rather	  than	  our	  success	  in	  using	  fallible	  introspective	  justification.	  By	  contrast,	  we	  cannot	  explain	  the	  unreliability	  of	  our	  perceptual	  beliefs	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  since	  it	  is	  so	  implausible	  to	  deny	  that	  perceptual	  illusions	  and	  hallucinations	  provide	  fallible	  justification	  by	  misrepresenting	  the	  environment.	  The	  simple	  theory	  explains	  this	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  perception	  and	  introspection	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  perception,	  unlike	  introspection,	  is	  representational.	  	  
4. Conclusions	  and	  Further	  Discussion	  Schwitzgebel	  makes	  a	  compelling	  case	  that	  introspection	  is	  unreliable	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  are	  prone	  to	  ignorance	  and	  error	  in	  making	  introspective	  judgments	  about	  our	  own	  conscious	  experience.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  a	  qualified	  version	  of	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis,	  according	  to	  which	  introspection	  is	  more	  reliable,	  and	  so	  less	  vulnerable	  to	  ignorance	  and	  error,	  than	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing	  about	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  sensory	  perception.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  claim	  that	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introspection,	  unlike	  perception,	  is	  immune	  from	  brute	  ignorance	  and	  error,	  although	  like	  perception,	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  ignorance	  and	  error	  that	  results	  from	  failures	  of	  basing.	  Therefore,	  I	  conclude	  that	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis	  is	  less	  damaging	  for	  the	  prospects	  of	  Cartesian	  epistemology	  than	  he	  claims.	  Before	  closing,	  I	  want	  to	  discuss	  three	  objections	  to	  this	  proposed	  reconciliation	  between	  Cartesian	  epistemology	  and	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis.	  I	  should	  note	  that	  these	  objections	  raise	  large-­‐scale	  issues	  that	  cannot	  be	  settled	  quickly.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  hope	  that	  my	  brief	  discussion	  will	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  outstanding	  challenges	  that	  are	  raised	  by	  Schwitzgebel’s	  work.	  The	  first	  objection	  is	  that	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis	  depends	  upon	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  introspection	  and	  other	  ways	  of	  knowing	  about	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  sensory	  perception.	  In	  response	  to	  this,	  Schwitzgebel	  (2011:	  136-­‐7;	  see	  also	  2012)	  argues	  that	  we	  cannot	  disentangle	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  processes	  that	  underpin	  our	  introspective	  and	  perceptual	  beliefs.	  But	  if	  introspection	  and	  perception	  are	  not	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  psychological	  processes,	  then	  how	  can	  introspection	  be	  epistemically	  privileged	  with	  respect	  to	  perception?	  This	  objection	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  questions	  about	  the	  epistemology	  of	  introspection	  are	  hostage	  to	  the	  psychology	  of	  introspection.	  However,	  the	  simple	  theory	  is	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  introspective	  justification,	  which	  makes	  introspective	  knowledge	  possible.	  It	  is	  not	  an	  account	  of	  the	  psychological	  mechanisms	  or	  processes	  that	  we	  use	  in	  forming	  introspectively	  justified	  beliefs	  and	  acquiring	  introspective	  knowledge.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  simple	  theory	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is	  concerned,	  it	  is	  an	  open	  question	  how	  these	  beliefs	  are	  formed,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  more	  or	  less	  directly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  experiences	  they	  are	  about.10	  Even	  if	  we	  cannot	  draw	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  perception	  and	  introspection	  at	  the	  level	  of	  psychological	  mechanisms,	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  at	  the	  level	  of	  epistemology.	  After	  all,	  the	  source	  of	  introspective	  justification	  is	  constituted	  by	  its	  subject	  matter,	  whereas	  the	  source	  of	  perceptual	  justification	  is	  constituted	  by	  representations	  of	  its	  subject	  matter.	  This	  is	  a	  crucial	  epistemological	  difference	  between	  perception	  and	  introspection	  which	  remains	  however	  much	  overlap	  there	  is	  between	  the	  psychological	  mechanisms	  and	  processes	  that	  underpin	  the	  formation	  of	  beliefs	  in	  perception	  and	  introspection.	  The	  second	  objection	  is	  that,	  assuming	  a	  reliabilist	  theory	  of	  justification,	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  epistemic	  privilege	  thesis	  defended	  here.	  According	  to	  reliabilism,	  which	  propositions	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  depends	  upon	  the	  reliability	  of	  one’s	  doxastic	  dispositions.	  In	  particular,	  one	  has	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  an	  experience	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  has	  a	  reliable	  introspective	  mechanism	  that	  disposes	  one	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  has	  experiences	  of	  that	  kind.	  So,	  if	  one’s	  introspective	  mechanisms	  are	  unreliable,	  then	  there	  will	  be	  cases	  of	  brute	  ignorance	  and	  brute	  error	  in	  which	  the	  experiences	  that	  one	  actually	  has	  come	  apart	  from	  the	  experiences	  that	  one	  has	  introspective	  justification	  to	  believe	  one	  has.	  Of	  course,	  reliabilism	  is	  very	  controversial	  and	  it	  would	  be	  question-­‐begging	  to	  assume	  it	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  critique	  of	  Cartesian	  epistemology.	  After	  all,	  Cartesian	  skeptical	  scenarios	  provide	  the	  inspiration	  for	  well	  known	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counterexamples	  to	  reliabilism,	  such	  as	  the	  “new	  evil	  demon”	  scenario,	  in	  which	  mental	  duplicates	  are	  alike	  in	  which	  propositions	  they	  have	  justification	  to	  believe,	  although	  they	  differ	  in	  the	  reliability	  of	  their	  doxastic	  dispositions.	  These	  examples	  motivate	  a	  rejection	  of	  reliabilism	  in	  favour	  of	  mentalism,	  according	  to	  which	  one’s	  mental	  states	  determine	  which	  propositions	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  reliability	  of	  their	  connections	  to	  the	  external	  world.	  Assuming	  reliabilism,	  there	  is	  no	  obvious	  reason	  to	  accept	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  introspection	  and	  perception,	  since	  ignorance	  and	  error	  is	  equally	  possible	  in	  each	  case.	  Assuming	  mentalism,	  by	  contrast,	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  brute	  ignorance	  and	  error	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  ignorance	  and	  error	  that	  results	  from	  failures	  of	  basing	  on	  the	  other.	  Given	  this	  distinction,	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  route	  from	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  to	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  epistemic	  asymmetry	  between	  perception	  and	  introspection.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  mental	  differences	  between	  perception	  and	  introspection	  ground	  corresponding	  epistemological	  differences.	  The	  third	  and	  final	  objection	  is	  that	  if	  introspective	  justification	  is	  defeasible,	  then	  it	  can	  be	  defeated	  by	  evidence	  that	  introspection	  is	  unreliable.	  In	  this	  way,	  Schwitzgebel’s	  argument	  for	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  can	  provide	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  more	  general	  argument	  for	  skepticism	  about	  introspection.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  introspection	  is	  no	  less	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  skepticism	  than	  perception.	  My	  inclination	  in	  response	  would	  be	  to	  deny	  the	  assumption	  that	  introspective	  justification	  is	  defeasible	  by	  evidence	  about	  its	  reliability.	  On	  this	  view,	  higher-­‐order	  evidence	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  introspection	  does	  not	  defeat	  one’s	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introspective	  justification	  for	  beliefs	  about	  one’s	  own	  experience,	  but	  rather	  poses	  an	  obstacle	  that	  prevents	  non-­‐ideal	  agents	  from	  exploiting	  their	  introspective	  justification	  in	  forming	  introspectively	  justified	  beliefs.11	  But	  since	  I	  do	  not	  have	  the	  space	  to	  defend	  that	  response	  here,	  let	  me	  simply	  note	  that	  introspective	  justification	  is	  not	  defeasible	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  perceptual	  justification.	  Since	  perception	  is	  representational,	  perceptual	  justification	  is	  defeasible	  by	  considerations	  that	  justify	  believing	  that	  one’s	  perceptual	  experience	  misrepresents	  the	  environment.	  Introspection,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  not	  representational	  and	  so	  the	  justification	  that	  is	  provided	  by	  one’s	  experience	  for	  believing	  that	  one	  has	  that	  experience	  cannot	  be	  defeated	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  So,	  even	  if	  introspection	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  skeptical	  arguments,	  it	  is	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  standard	  forms	  of	  skeptical	  argument	  that	  apply	  in	  the	  case	  of	  perception.	  In	  conclusion,	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  in	  epistemology,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  premature	  to	  conclude	  that	  it	  constitutes	  a	  decisive	  case	  against	  Cartesian	  epistemology.	  As	  I	  have	  been	  arguing,	  the	  simple	  theory	  of	  introspection	  provides	  the	  resources	  for	  reconciling	  Schwitzgebel’s	  unreliability	  thesis	  with	  a	  broadly	  Cartesian	  epistemology.12	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                                                1	  See	  Bayne	  and	  Spener	  (2010)	  and	  Spener	  (this	  volume)	  for	  defence	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  introspection	  is	  reliable	  within	  a	  restricted	  domain	  of	  operation.	  2	  See	  Kriegel	  (this	  volume)	  for	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  methodological	  implications	  of	  the	  unreliability	  thesis	  for	  the	  science	  of	  consciousness.	  3	  See	  MacPherson	  (2010:	  234-­‐40)	  for	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  patients	  with	  Anton’s	  syndrome	  do	  not	  have	  visual	  experiences,	  but	  merely	  report	  falsely	  that	  they	  do.	  4	  Burge	  (1988:	  657)	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘brute	  error’	  in	  a	  distinct,	  but	  related	  sense	  to	  denote	  errors	  that	  “do	  not	  result	  from	  any	  sort	  of	  carelessness,	  malfunction,	  or	  irrationality	  on	  our	  part.”	  5	  See	  Horgan	  and	  Kriegel	  (2007)	  for	  an	  exposition	  of	  this	  view.	  6	  See	  Smithies	  (2012a)	  for	  an	  extended	  discussion	  and	  defence	  of	  the	  simple	  theory	  of	  introspection.	  7	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Eric	  Schwitzgebel	  for	  pressing	  me	  to	  consider	  this	  objection.	  8	  See	  Smithies	  (2012b)	  for	  a	  similar	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  speckled	  hen.	  If	  one’s	  perceptual	  experience	  represents	  that	  a	  hen	  is	  48-­‐speckled,	  or	  more	  realistically,	  that	  it	  has	  a	  determinate	  shade,	  red-­‐48,	  then	  this	  is	  what	  one	  has	  justification	  to	  believe.	  Nevertheless,	  one	  may	  be	  unable	  to	  form	  a	  justified	  belief	  that	  the	  hen	  is	  red-­‐48,	  since	  one’s	  doxastic	  dispositions	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  sensitive	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  representing	  red-­‐48	  versus	  red-­‐47	  or	  red-­‐49.	  
9 Compare:	  it	  may	  be	  justified	  by	  ordinary	  standards	  to	  withhold	  belief	  in	  logical	  truths,	  but	  if	  probabilistic	  coherence	  is	  ideally	  justified,	  then	  it	  is	  justified	  by	  ideal	  standards	  to	  be	  certain	  of	  all	  logical	  truths. 10	  This	  is	  not	  something	  that	  Schwitzgebel	  disputes.	  See	  Schwitzgebel	  (2012:	  42-­‐3)	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  introspective	  judgments	  must	  reflect,	  or	  at	   least	  aim	  to	  reflect,	  “some	  relatively	  direct	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  target	  state”.	  11	  See	  Smithies	  (forthcoming)	  for	  this	  account	  of	  higher-­‐order	  evidence.	  12	  Thanks	  to	  Eric	  Schwitzgebel,	  Daniel	  Stoljar	  and	  an	  audience	  at	  the	  Pacific	  Meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association	  in	  April	  2012	  for	  helpful	  comments	  and	  discussion.	  
